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Abstract 
 
 
 
In Malawi, informal off-farm labour (ganyu) has often been described as a survival 
strategy which eventually drives poor rural households into even further destitution. Based on 
data from the Second Integrated Household Survey for 2004, we estimate the determinants of 
the decision to supply labour in the ganyu market and the amount of labour supplied. Our 
results do not support the conjecture that ganyu is necessarily a low-return strategy that 
confines subsistence constrained households to a vicious circle of poverty. However, we do 
find evidence that ganyu is used as an ex-post coping strategy in the event of shocks, and as 
an ex-ante social insurance mechanism. Moreover, we generally find a positive reaction of 
ganyu supply to an increase in the ganyu wages, and no evidence of any backward bending 
segment of the supply curve for households close to the subsistence level. While ganyu does 
not appear to drive poor households into further destitution, these households do seem to 
suffer the most when they face demand side constraints in times of greatest needs. 
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1. Introduction 
 During the past several decades, a growing literature has focused on the evolution of 
well-being and the tendency of individuals, households and communities to be trapped in 
chronic poverty (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Barrett and Swallow, 2006; Carter and 
Barrett, 2006). A special class of poverty trap models relies on the existence of multiple 
dynamic equilibria, with at least one of them lying below the standard poverty line. Shocks 
that push people below the poverty threshold knock them into a downward spiral of 
destitution (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Dercon, 1998, 2005). When the threshold is defined at 
the subsistence level, individuals are likely to collapse into a nutritional poverty trap 
(Dasgupta, 1993; 1997; Dasgupta and Ray, 1987).  
 There is evidence suggesting that a vast majority of rural households in Malawi are 
close to, or below the subsistence threshold, with few income diversification options other 
than cropping activities (Devereux, 1999; Whiteside, 2000). As a result, they may end up 
selecting low-risk, low-return portfolios that presumably lower the risk of hunger, but 
paradoxically push them into the spiral of greater destitution (Barret et al., 2008). Ganyu – 
off-farm informal labour, usually on somebody else’s farm – has often been described as such 
a paradoxical risk management mechanism. According to data from the Second Integrated 
Household Survey for 2004 (Malawi Government, 2004) about 52% of all rural households 
offer ganyu. 
 Whiteside (2000) argues that subsistence constrained households tend to supply 
more ganyu the lower the wage, and neglect production on their own fields in order to meet 
the ganyu supply requirements. Taken together, the low income received for their work 
outside the farm, and the next period’s decreased productivity on their neglected farms, push 
these household into a poverty trap.  
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 This perception of ganyu has long been stylised in the literature and has become a 
starting point of a number of studies on poverty in Malawi. The more general literature on 
agriculture in Malawi seems to suggest that the subsistence constraint that leads to ganyu may 
be a result of structural anomalies such as small land sizes, credit constraints and labour and 
fertilizer shortages (Alwang and Siegel, 1999; Orr, 2000; Orr and Mwale, 2001; Ellis et al., 
2003; Harrigan, 2003). However, most of this research uses regional surveys prior to the time 
when the effect of the 1990s’ structural reform could be widely felt1 and few of these studies 
address the issue of ganyu labour explicitly.  
 Only recently, a formal test of the hypothesis that ganyu labour represents a 
(seasonal) poverty trap has questioned the stylised perception of ganyu labour. Orr et al. 
(2009) have argued that the supply of ganyu does not necessarily have a causal effect on the 
consequent neglect of one’s own field and subsequent reduction in own farm productivity. 
Indeed, the authors show that ganyu may not even be a result of a binding consumption 
constraint, but may instead represent an important source of additional income to be used for 
the purchase of fertilizer and other productivity promoting activities.  
We intend to follow up on these observations, by providing a more systematic labour 
market framework and empirical tests based on a recent national survey. In particular, we 
would like to contrast the different perceptions of ganyu labour and find out whether it is a 
low-return strategy that confines subsistence constrained rural workers to a vicious circle of 
poverty (Whiteside, 2000) as opposed to the typical off-farm labour supply mechanism 
explored in the income diversification literature that focuses on ways to escape the poverty 
trap (Orr et al., 2009; Barrett et al., 2001; Reardon et al., 1992; Dercon and Krishnan, 1996). 
In doing so, we also consider some less popular explanations of the phenomenon of ganyu 
labour, such as ganyu being either an ex-ante risk mitigating strategy that creates a long-term 
                                                 
1 For detailed review of structural reform policies in Malawi during the 1990s, see Harrigan (2003). These 
included mostly crop diversification out of maize into non-traditional agricultural crops and the introduction and 
subsequent removal of fertilizer subsidies. 
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relationship between employers and employees or an ex-post coping mechanism used when 
misfortune strikes. These mechanisms have attracted a lot of attention in both the general 
literature on rural market insurance, income diversification and poverty (e.g. Kochar, 1999; 
Dercon, 2004) and in the ethnographic literature on Malawi (e.g. Englund, 1999), but have 
largely been neglected by economists studying ganyu labour in Malawi. 
To set the scene, Section 2 presents some descriptive statistics based on the Second 
Integrated Household Survey to discuss the relevance of ganyu in rural Malawi, and the 
general characteristics of households that participate in the ganyu labour market. In Section 3, 
we develop a conceptual framework to derive concrete hypotheses about the households’ 
strategies when they offer ganyu. The methodology used for testing these hypotheses is 
discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we present our estimation strategy and our econometric 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Ganyu labour in rural Malawi: A general overview 
To assess the phenomenon of ganyu labour in rural Malawi we use the Second 
Integrated Household Survey 2004, available upon request from the World Bank. Data were 
collected between March 2004 and March 2005. The survey covers a stratified random 
sample of 11 280 households (including a total of 52 702 individuals or 0.42% of the Malawi 
population), over the whole area of the country. As ganyu is predominantly a rural 
phenomenon, and labour supply decisions by non-agricultural households generally tend to be 
based on different considerations, we restrict our sample to agricultural households, which 
represent approximately 89% of the sample. This reduces the sample size to 10 032 
observations.  
Table 1 highlights the prevalence of ganyu in Malawi and shows the characteristics of 
the households participating in the ganyu labour market. The first line shows that ganyu is a 
wide-spread phenomenon. During the year of the survey, more than half of the rural 
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households in Malawi (44% + 9%) supplied some ganyu, and about one quarter (16% + 9%) 
recruited ganyu.  
A particularly noticeable feature is that as significant share as 9% of the households 
engage in both supply and demand of ganyu. A plausible explanation of the simultaneous 
supply and demand of ganyu labour could be the exchange of agricultural and non-
agricultural ganyu chores in the market. For instance, a household may have members 
working on other people’s fields, while also hiring ganyu labour for activities such as home 
construction or brick burning. Moreover, simultaneous ganyu supply and demand could also 
be a result of a desire to build building a social network on which households may count in 
times of need. This could explain the exchange of workers even within similar and purely 
agricultural activities.  
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here>> 
 
The following rows provide some information on the well-being of households. The 
first indicator represents the headcount poverty rate, defined by the World Bank as the 
proportion of people falling below the poverty line of 16 165 Malawi Kwacha (MK) per 
person per year or 44.3 MK per person per day (corresponding to 0.42 USD at 2004 exchange 
rates). The second indicator is the anthropometric measure of severe malnutrition ‘weight for 
age’. Children under 5 years are considered severely undernourished if their weight falls 
3 standard deviations or more below the standard reference weight provided by the WHO for 
the corresponding age group (WHO, 2007). As opposed to anthropometric measures based on 
height, this indicator measures the impact of recent, rather than long-term, restrictions in 
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nutritional intake (Sahn and Stifel, 2002). Finally, we consider whether the household has a 
corrugated iron roof, which is a key indicator of wealth in rural Malawi.2  
For the population as a whole all of these indicators indicate wide-spread poverty. In 
all groups, the poverty incidence is substantial, severe child malnutrition ranges between 5% 
and 9%. However, the comparison of ganyu supplying and ganyu recruiting households 
indicates that on average and despite overall poverty, the latter are significantly better off than 
the former. Figure 1 confirms this observation by showing a clear decrease of ganyu supply 
and increase of ganyu demand with the increase of household consumption expenditures. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is an incidence of over 30% of ganyu supply even 
among the richest households. This suggests that ganyu is a more complex phenomenon than 
simply one of the ‘rich’ exploiting the ‘poor’ (Bryceson, 2006). 
 
<< Insert Figure 1 about here>> 
 
Returning to Table 1 we can compare some additional characteristics of ganyu 
supplying and demanding households. On average, ganyu supplying households are slightly 
smaller, much more often headed by females (which may be another, more indirect indicator 
of destitution, see Green and Baden 1994; Bryceson, 2006; Devereux, 1999), and 
considerably less educated.  
Agricultural cultivation appears to be similar for both groups, with a strong focus on 
maize throughout. While cash crops are grown more frequently by ganyu demanding 
households, they are very common for ganyu supplying households, too. Furthermore, the 
high yielding variety of hybrid maize is now widespread, as opposed to the early 1990s when 
hybrid maize was hardly ever produced by local subsistence farmers (Green and Baden, 1994; 
Sahn et al., 1990). However, Table 1 indicates that the share of uncultivated land is noticeably 
                                                 
2 We thank one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out to us. 
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higher for ganyu supplying households. It is possible that a family member providing ganyu 
cannot always be easily replaced.  
As might be expected, the means of most variables for households that both supply 
and demand ganyu are somewhere in-between those of households that either only supply or 
only demand ganyu. The most noticeable exception is that of the average number of 
household members. Households engaged in both ganyu supply and demand appear to be 
significantly larger than households engaged in only supply or only demand (which in turn, 
are significantly larger than those engaged in neither of the two). Apparently, relatively large 
households are more frequently involved in the exchange of family members’ labour via 
ganyu.  
Let us conclude our overview of ganyu in Malawi by looking at the regional and 
seasonal spread of the phenomenon. Figure 2 presents the share of households involved in 
hiring ganyu by season and district. As a seasonal differentiation is not available for supply, 
we use the hiring data to reflect the overall prevalence of ganyu. Households in urban districts 
are included if they are engaged in agricultural activities.  
 
<< Insert Figure 2 about here>> 
 
Figure 2 indicates considerable differences in the prevalence of ganyu across regions. 
Generally, ganyu is less frequent in the northern part of Malawi. In addition, it becomes clear 
that ganyu is much more relevant in the rainy than in the dry season. This may be related to a 
stronger need of workers during the rainy season, but also to the fact that the end of the rainy 
season (January to March) corresponds to the period of greatest difficulty to meet 
consumption needs. The main harvest takes place during the dry season (March to October) 
and generally ensures at least a minimum level of consumption.  
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3. Ganyu supply decisions: Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
While the preceding section has provided us with a general overview of ganyu in 
Malawi and possibly suggested some initial lines of thought regarding its determinants, we 
are now going to propose a more systematic conceptual framework in the context of which 
different ganyu supply decisions can be assessed. As ganyu represents a wage labour choice 
for farm households, the traditional model of off-farm labour supply by farm households (e.g. 
Benjamin, 1992; Rosenzweig, 1980; Huffman, 1980) provides a natural starting point for our 
analysis. In this model, the off-farm labour supply decisions of farm households are a result of 
maximization of a household utility function subject to constraints on time, income and farm 
production. Households are assumed to maximise utility from consumption goods (C), 
leisure (L), and demographic factors exogenous to the current household consumption 
decisions, such as the members’ age and household size (A). The utility function:  
(1)    U=U (C, L; A)       
is assumed to be ordinal and strictly concave. 
The household faces the above mentioned three constraints on its resources. First, the 
total time endowment of household members (T) is allocated across farm work (Tf), off-farm 
work (Toff) and leisure (L): 
(2) T=Tf+Toff+L 
Secondly, the household income received from members’ off-farm work at wage rates 
(woff), net farm income (pfQ-wfH), and non-labour household income (V) is spent on 
consumption goods: 
(3) woff Toff+(pfQ-wfH) +V=pcC 
where pf and pc are the prices of farm output Q and consumption goods C respectively, 
wf is the wage for work on the farm, and H is hired labour. Assuming that purchased 
consumption and produced output are sold on a single competitive market, we can set pf=pc, 
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which implies that it does not matter whether the farmer sells his production or directly 
consumes it. 
 Finally, the properties of the farm production function restrict the potential size of the 
household budget. Farm output is produced by members’ time inputs on the farm, hired 
labour, and a vector of semi-fixed inputs (X) such as the amount and quality of land or 
farmer’s education. The production function is thus given by: 
(4)    Q=F(Tf, H; X) 
It is assumed to be strictly concave, so that the farmer’s optimisation problem can be solved. 
 Utility maximisation then leaves us with a reduced form equation of off-farm labour 
supply (ganyu supply) as a function of the off-farm wage, the on-farm wage (which in turn 
depends on semi-fixed farm inputs relevant for productivity), prices of consumption goods, 
non-labour income and demographic characteristics of the household: 
(5)                                    Toff=S(woff, wf(X), pc, V, A)≥0 
In this framework, all factors of production are paid prices equivalent to their marginal 
productivities and hence resources are allocated towards their most productive uses. In our 
context, given that off-farm and on-farm labour are considered to be essentially very similar 
activities, competitive markets should even lead to an equality between woff and wf (as in 
Benjamin, 1992). This is a special case of our model. 
Generally, as long as productivity differences can occur, the increased on-farm 
productivity will lead to higher wf(X), induce a substitution between the two types of work, 
and therefore reduce ganyu supply (Rosenzweig, 1980). A rise in the price of consumption 
goods pc makes leisure relatively more costly and should therefore lead to a reallocation of 
time towards work, including ganyu. By contrast, higher non-labour income (V) relaxes the 
budget constraint and induces the household to work less. Relevant household characteristics 
(A), like age and number of adults, predominantly affect the preference for leisure because 
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young children and elderly people cannot easily bear long work hours (or may not be able to 
work at all).  
Let us finally consider the effect of a rise in the wage for ganyu (woff). This is most 
interesting in our context as it is closely related to the current debate on ganyu in the 
literature. A change in ganyu wage leads to opposing income and substitution effects with 
respect to leisure. As long as leisure is a normal good, the substitution effect dominates so that 
rising wages lead to higher ganyu supply. This is reflected in the typical upward sloping 
labour supply curve we generally observe. We would also expect a substitution effect between 
on- and off-farm work which should further strengthen the positive relationship between 
ganyu wages and ganyu supply.  
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the income effect of a change in woff 
becomes so strong that it dominates over the substitution effects. Thus the total impact of woff 
may be ambiguous (Huffman, 1980). Standard textbooks on labour economics would usually 
consider a backward bending labour supply curve for very high wages. In this case, an 
increasing wage does not make work much more attractive than leisure any more, so that the 
substitution effect becomes relatively irrelevant and is dominated by the income effect. 
However, in the context of a very poor country such as Malawi, another situation would 
appear more relevant.  
Consider that, in addition to the constraints discussed in the model above, the 
households face a subsistence constraint. In this situation, households are so poor that they 
need to compensate any decrease in wages by an increase in working time to meet their 
subsistence needs. In this case, the income effect dominates, too, and we again obtain a 
negatively sloped labour supply curve. This is the situation Whiteside (2000) seems to have in 
mind in his discussion of ganyu in Malawi.  
Finally, as highlighted by Dessing (2002), there may be situations where, even with 
maximum labour input, households are not able to cover their subsistence needs. In this case, 
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people lose health, strength and energy so that even their otherwise exogenous time budget 
(T) becomes endogenous and begins to shrink. While they continue to provide maximum 
possible labour, decreasing wages will further reduce T so that we get to a positive 
relationship between labour and wages. Figure 3 presents the corresponding labour supply 
curve.  
<< Insert Figure 3 about here>> 
 
As highlighted by Dessing (2002), what primarily matters for the slope of the wage to 
be expected in a poor country is the distance of the households from the subsistence 
constraint. In the context of rural Malawi, productive activities on-farm (and possibly other 
non-labour income) also contribute to meeting the subsistence constraint. Therefore, rather 
than comparing the slope of the labour supply function for different ranges of the ganyu wage, 
it appears to be appropriate to compare the slopes by different income groups. If ganyu is 
indeed used as a means to ensure food security and to comply with a given subsistence 
constraint, in analogy to Dessing (2002), we should find evidence for the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: As opposed to other households, for households with incomes close to the 
subsistence level, there is a negative relationship between ganyu wages and ganyu supply. 
In addition, if, rather than representing a general alternative to on-farm labour supply 
as suggested by the model outlined above, ganyu is supplied predominantly as a last resort 
strategy to meet the subsistence constraint (Whiteside, 2000), there should be evidence for the 
following hypothesis:  
H2: Ganyu is supplied predominantly by households close to and under the 
subsistence level. 
Another, complementary and partially related explanation of ganyu supply could be its 
use as an ex-post coping strategy in response to shocks. In line with the above arguments 
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on ganyu as a means to ensure a certain minimum income, this effect can be expected to be 
strongest for low-income households. More generally, the idea is that on-farm production 
processes may not allow the household to optimally reallocate resources immediately after a 
shock. If the ganyu labour is flexible and capable of accommodating the additional rural 
labour released, an increase in ganyu supply can be used to smooth consumption. This 
argument goes again beyond our simple neoclassical model, as this model does not consider 
adjustment or any kind of transaction cost. We can summarize it in the following two 
hypotheses: 
H3: Ganyu supply increases in the event of a shock. 
H4: The poorer the household, the stronger is the increase of ganyu supply after a 
shock. 
Finally, the literature on Malawi as well as some of our descriptive statistics in 
Section 2 suggest that ganyu may be used to forge long-term social relationships. Indeed 
Englund (1999) and Whiteside (2000) note that households sometimes supply ganyu even in 
periods when they do not have to struggle to meet their consumption constraints and when, at 
the same time, their labour is highly productive at home. The authors explain this situation by 
the fact that in order to make sure that they will be able to supply ganyu in periods of need, 
rural households tend to supply ganyu even at times when they do not need to do so. In this 
case, ganyu would thus be used ex-ante, ahead of any shocks, in order to sustain the 
employer-employee relationship – like some kind of a risk insurance based on social 
networking. 
Again, in this context, our simple neoclassical model of efficient resource allocation in 
rural Malawi will fail to make accurate predictions. Conceptually, one could represent this 
situation as an extension to the baseline farm model by including decision-making under 
uncertainty, along the lines of the two-period insurance/consumption smoothing models 
suggested in the literature (e.g. Kochar, 1999; Rose, 2001). The household makes both 
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production and labour supply decisions in each period, namely the period prior to which a 
shock affecting production is realized and the period when the value of the shock has been 
revealed. The implication of this framework is that, aside from the usual determinants of off-
farm labour supply, risk (and or shock) expectations will be taken into account. We therefore 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H5: Rural households use ganyu as an ex-ante networking strategy to cope with future 
shocks. 
As consumption smoothing can be considered to be most relevant for the poor (see e.g. 
World Bank, 2007), but yet, the smoothing strategy is reported by Eglund (1999) and 
Whiteside (2000) for households at times they are not in extreme need, we should expect to 
observe this mechanism particularly for some intermediate income groups. This leads to our 
final hypothesis: 
H6: Ganyu as an ex-ante networking strategy is most frequent for poor, but not 
extremely poor households. 
Before proceeding, note that our different hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
Households may simultaneously follow several strategies with their supply of ganyu. 
Moreover, different types of households may have different priorities. In the following, we 
will try to assess to what extent any or all of these strategies can be observed in rural Malawi, 
and to what extent the use of these strategies depends on the level of income.  
 
4. Empirical strategy  
Using the data from the Second Integrated Household Survey 2004 already described 
in Section 2, we will examine the above hypotheses in a straightforward labour supply 
regression. A detailed description of all variables can be found in the Annex, Table A1. The 
absolute number of days a household provides ganyu during the year of the survey represents 
our dependent variable. Our control variables are all directly based on the basic off-farm 
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labour supply model introduced above. In addition, we introduce a few specific variables to 
test our hypotheses. 
To assess the relevance of ganyu as a last resort strategy to cope with a binding 
subsistence constraint, we proceed as follows:  
First, the impact of wages on ganyu supply is estimated for different income groups. 
In keeping with the literature on on- and off-farm labour supply (Rosenzweig, 1980) we proxy 
the ganyu wage with the regional wage rates, obtained by dividing the total amount paid by 
farmers hiring ganyu by the days of ganyu labour employed and averaging this daily wage 
rate within the district. If H1 is correct, there should be a negative relationship between ganyu 
wages and ganyu supply for the income group around the subsistence level, while this should 
not be the case for other income groups. In the Malawi Household Survey, the subsistence 
level is indicated by a calorie based minimum intake per capita corresponding to an annual 
expenditure of 16 541 KW (ca. 155 USD) which is similar to the national poverty line (cf. 
Section 2). The subsistence level falls in the second lowest expenditure quintile. Households 
in the second expenditure quintile are thus all relatively close to the subsistence level. If H1 is 
correct, their ganyu labour supply function should respond negatively to ganyu wages. For the 
lower expenditure quintile and the higher expenditure quintiles, the Dessing (2002) arguments 
would lead us to expect a positive relationship. 
Second, we assess H2 which claims that ganyu is supplied predominantly by 
households at or under the subsistence level. The most straight forward procedure here is to 
simply include a dummy variable for households at or under the calorie based minimum 
intake expenditure defined above. If H2 is correct, this dummy variable should have a positive 
and significant coefficient in our regression.  
However, this is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the acceptance of 
H2. A positive coefficient of the dummy variable would also be consistent with the generally 
negative impact of increased income on labour supply – just as the income effect induced by 
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non-labour income V discussed in the context of our model in Section 3. If there is a specific 
relevance of the subsistence constraint in our context, we should find a very strong effect on 
ganyu supply when households cross this particular expenditure level, and only a much 
smaller effect elsewhere. Introducing the expenditure quintiles as individual dummy variables 
into our ganyu supply regression, H2 would thus lead us to expect a noticeably strong jump 
between the coefficients of quintile 2 and quintile 3. 
Let us now discuss how we can find out whether ganyu is used as an ex-post coping 
strategy in the event of a shock. In the Malawi Household Survey, families were required to 
report information on the occurrence of different types of shocks such as death or illness of 
family members, theft and damage, natural disasters, or a sharp rise in the price of 
consumption goods. H3 claims that these shocks should increase ganyu supply. However, we 
cannot simply add a general shock dummy into our regression because different shocks may 
have different impacts. This may affect the timing and the intensity of the effect. For instance, 
if the household is hit by death or severe illness of one of its members, not only household 
income, but also available labour time will be affected. Even if the income effect of the shock 
induces the household to supply more ganyu, this effect could be partially offset by the 
reduced availability of labour in the family. In cases of damage or theft, only the income 
effect is relevant, but it might be less severe than in the case of a loss of family members. Yet 
other shocks, like floods or droughts or an increase in the price of consumption goods, are 
relevant for a whole village and not only for individual households. In this case, many people 
might want to supply more ganyu and (despite flexible prices) the ganyu labour market may 
not be able to absorb them all. Hence, their supply could be restricted by the reduced demand. 
The constraint would be greatest if the fields of farmers that usually hire ganyu are also 
affected by the shock.  
While we do not have theoretical foundations behind possible differences in the effect 
of the different shocks, the plausible existence of such differences make us consider the effect 
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of all above mentioned types of shocks as three separate dummy variables, i.e. (i) household 
shocks due to accidents, illness or death of working-age members of the household, (ii) 
household shocks due to damage or theft, and (iii) village shocks due to droughts, floods, crop 
pest or a sharp rise in food price. 
These shocks may also have their effect on ganyu supply within a different time 
horizon. While we would expect a household level shock to call for immediate adjustments, 
the immediate consequence of most village level shocks will be bad harvests. While people 
will usually still have enough food during the harvesting time itself, food stocks will often be 
exhausted before the next harvest, thus increasing the desire of households to supply ganyu. 
We therefore consider the effect of village level shocks with a one-period lag. To find out 
whether the use of ganyu as an ex-post coping mechanism after shocks is particularly relevant 
for the poorer households (H4), we will test the argument separately for the different 
expenditure quintiles. 
Finally, we would like to find out whether rural households use ganyu as an ex-ante 
networking strategy to cope with future shocks (H5), especially when they fall into some 
intermediate income range (H6). A direct test of these hypotheses would be possible only in a 
multi-period framework where household behaviour could be observed before and after the 
shock. However, high quality panel data that could easily track ex-ante and ex-post reactions 
to shocks is not available in our case. Other authors examining rural household behaviour 
faced similar constraints. Hence, aside from Rose (2001), most of the literature testing the 
insurance mechanism behind off-farm labour supply has relied on cross sectional data and 
explored the impact of contemporaneous shocks on contemporaneous off-farm labour supply.  
However, finding a positive impact of shocks on off-farm labour supply at a given 
point in time is not sufficient to infer the existence of an insurance mechanism, even if wage 
adjustments are controlled for. In fact, finding such a positive impact only supports the 
existence of the ex-post adjustment mechanism already discussed above. How then can we 
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assess whether, in addition, people use ganyu as a social networking or insurance mechanism 
ex-ante?  
We follow an indirect approach. If, as suggested by Whiteside (2000) and Egglund 
(1999), social networking through ganyu at normal times is required to be able to supply more 
ganyu in times of need, a household suddenly facing a shock would find it difficult to enter 
the ganyu market if it has not been active in this market before. We will test this argument by 
estimating a separate probability to supply ganyu equation along with the general ganyu 
supply function. If ganyu is only an ex-post coping mechanism available independently of 
social networking through ganyu ex-ante, the probability to enter the ganyu market on the 
supply side and the number of ganyu days supplied (conditional on entry) should be 
determined by the same factors. In particular, household and village shocks should then have 
a positive effect not only on the number of ganyu days supplied, but also on the probability to 
enter the ganyu market. If, however, shocks do not have any significantly positive impact on 
market entry, while they do have a significantly positive effect on ganyu days supplied, we 
will interpret this as evidence for the existence of a social insurance mechanism. To see 
whether the use of this mechanism differs between income groups, we will again consider 
regressions by expenditure quintile along with the overall regression across all households. 
Before concluding this section, let us briefly discuss our control variables derived 
in the model in Section 3. To capture own-farm productivity and thus, indirectly, the (shadow) 
wage of own-farm production wf(X), we could use a number of characteristics of the land, the 
type of crops, crop diversification, the use of fertilizer etc. However, many of these variables 
may not be exogenous. We thus retain only one indicator variable of a particularly small plot 
(<0.5 hectares), and another indicator variable for production during the dry season (which is 
only possible in certain locations). Neither of these is likely to change in the short run. The 
possibility to produce during the dry season clearly increases the farm’s overall productivity 
and should thus have a negative effect on off-farm labour. Conversely, small land size should 
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have a negative effect on productivity as it does not allow the efficient use of machinery such 
as ploughs etc. In addition, in Malawi, land sizes smaller than 0.5 hectares imply that a 
household is practically landless, a fact that can be expected to reinforce the positive effect on 
ganyu supply (Green and Baden, 1994).  
As an additional determinant of own-farm productivity, we consider human capital. 
Two types of measures of human capital have been used in household level labour supply 
equations, namely the education and age or experience of the head of household and the 
average levels of education and age of the household members. Since the human capital 
characteristics of household members are typically highly correlated and the measures for the 
household head are less likely to be endogenous (Rizov and Swinnen, 2004), we give 
preference to the former. Specifically, we define our educational indicator as the years of 
education, and the experience indicator as the age of the household head.  
One could argue that human capital should increase the productivity of ganyu as much 
as it increases the productivity of on-farm labour, so that the overall effect on ganyu supply 
could be ambiguous. However, the human capital intensity of most ganyu activities is 
typically low, with less scope for innovations than activities on one’s own farm. For this 
reason, we expect the positive productivity effect on one’s own farm to dominate, and the 
effect on ganyu supply to be negative. 
Apart from on-farm wages and their determinants, the model requires control for food 
prices (pc), for non-labour income or wealth (V) and for relevant household characteristics 
(A). Changes in the prices of food are included in our village shock variable, at least if they 
are substantial. As a proxy for wealth, that is not directly related to labour, we introduce the 
presence of an iron roof discussed in Section 2. 
In so far as household characteristics are concerned, we primarily attempt to capture 
the work capacity of the household, which is proxied by the number of adults (15-65 years) 
and by the proportion of dependents, i.e. of children under 15 and elderly people. We expect a 
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positive effect on ganyu supply of the former, and a negative effect of the latter. Moreover, 
we include a control variable for female headed households as the latter may have an impact 
on the general restrictions faced by the family. In keeping with the literature, we expect that 
ganyu supply in female headed households will be higher. Finally, we introduce a dummy 
variable for northern regions, since our descriptive statistics suggested that different traditions 
in different parts of the country also affect ganyu supply. Based on the results presented in 
Figure 2, we expect ganyu to be much more wide-spread in the south.  
 
5. Econometric methods and empirical results 
To estimate the ganyu supply function we use a tobit model in order to take into 
account the censored nature of our data. Obviously, households can only choose either a 
strictly positive ganyu supply or a corner solution of zero. As we are not interested in the 
effect of our explanatory variables on some rather artificial latent concept such as the 
“preference for ganyu supply”, but on the actual (positive) days of ganyu labour supplied, we 
will not directly present the coefficients of the tobit equation (cf. Wooldrige, 2002: 518 and 
520ff.). Instead, we present marginal effects with respect to the expected number of days of 
ganyu supply, given that this supply is positive E(ganyu days | ganyu days>0). 
To separately estimate the households’ probability to enter the ganyu market on the 
supply side, we estimate a simple probit model for Pr(ganyu days>0). To facilitate the 
interpretation of our results, just as for the tobit model, we display the relevant marginal 
effects (setting all variables at their mean).  
Before presenting the results, a few additional estimation problems need to be 
considered. First, our data is drawn from a stratified random sample, so that observations 
within strata may not be fully independent. This could lead to an underestimation of standard 
errors and thus an over-confidence in our regression results. To avoid this problem, for the 
probit model, we use the Huber-White sandwich estimator of the variance-covariance matrix 
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as implemented by the STATA survey data commands. However, in the tobit case, the 
variance-covariance matrix cannot be adjusted in the same way. As an alternative, we 
determine our standard errors through bootstrapping which also allows us to take stratification 
into account.  
Second, there may be concerns with respect to the possible endogeneity of some of our 
variables. This concern may arise with respect to ganyu wages. If overall supply of ganyu is 
high, wages may decrease, which would create a problem of reverse causality. However, we 
consider supply by individual households, and assume the relevant labour market to be 
regional. The regional wage rates for the 26 Malawi districts should not be influenced by 
individual supply decisions.  
Endogeneity may also be a problem with respect to different variables used to capture 
own-farm productivity. As discussed in Section 4 above, we are already quite selective with 
the inclusion of these variables, keeping only those which can most plausibly be assumed to 
be exogenous. Thus, the availability of only a small area for own cultivation does not appear 
to be something which can be easily changed, and the cultivation of crops in the dry season 
depends to a large extent on external factors such as the geographic location of the farm. To 
be sure, we carry out an endogeneity test using the two-step procedure for tobit models 
outlined by Wooldridge (2002: 530f.). The instruments used are the regional share of small 
area farms and the ethnic background of the household head, respectively. We thereby cover 
geographical and cultural factors which should be truly exogenous, and which are highly 
correlated with our variables of interest. Using these instruments for the above mentioned test, 
the hypothesis of exogeneity of our initial variables cannot be rejected at any conventional 
level of significance. We therefore stick to the initial variables in our regressions, and 
consider them as exogenous. 
On the basis of this discussion, we can now present our empirical results. 
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Table 2 shows the outcome of our overall regressions across all income groups. The 
difference between the first and the second pair of regressions lies in the specification of the 
income group. For both specifications, we run a tobit regression to estimate the actual ganyu 
labour supply function (Regr. 1 and 3), and a probit regression to estimate the probability to 
enter the ganyu market on the supply side (Regr. 2 and 4).  
Our control variables generally show the expected coefficients – a fact that we 
interpret as a positive sign for the general reliability of our specification. In the tobit 
regressions, all variables indicating higher own-farm productivity (experience and education 
of the household head, and the opportunity to also cultivate crops in the dry season) show a 
significant negative relationship with ganyu supply, while the reduced own-farm production 
possibilities reflected in a small farm area, are positively related to ganyu supply. Non-labour 
income or wealth as indicated by the iron roof affects ganyu supply negatively. And the 
number of adult household members (as opposed to the share of dependents) has a positive 
impact on ganyu supply. Households living in the northern part of the country are 
substantially less involved in ganyu supply than those in the south. For all but a few variables, 
the probit estimation points in the same direction.3 The two exceptions are female headed 
households whose positive effect on ganyu is significant only in the probit model, and crop 
cultivation during the dry season which, surprisingly, appears to lead to a higher probability to 
enter the ganyu market (while reducing the expected number of days of ganyu supplied). 
Let us now turn to the actual variables of interest to test our hypotheses. We observe 
that the ganyu wage has a highly significant positive effect throughout. Hypothesis 1 
postulates that this is true for all but the households around subsistence level, an issue that 
                                                 
3 The tobit model actually works under the assumption that the underlying decision making process for entry and 
supply (given entry) work in the same way. If this assumption is true, we should find similar effects. If we find 
relevant differences in the signs of a number of coefficients between the probit and the tobit model, tobit 
coefficients for days of ganyu (given ganyu days>0) will be biased towards the coefficients of the probit 
estimations. This implies that if we do find differences in coefficients, the actual differences between the market 
entry and the supply decision can be expected to be even bigger. This is of a certain interest here as our 
theoretical discussion implies some differences with respect to the impact of the shock variables. 
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will be tested later in our regressions differentiating by expenditure group. On average, this 
may lead to the positive effect found in Regressions 1-4.  
Being at or under the subsistence level has a strong and significant positive effect on 
both the amount ganyu supplied and on the probability to enter the ganyu market. Households 
under the subsistence level have a 10% higher probability to be involved in any ganyu, and 
then, on average, supply 11 more days than otherwise comparable families above the 
subsistence level. However, Regressions 3 and 4 reveal that this effect is in fact not a single 
‘jump’ in ganyu supply related to the subsistence constraint. Rather, we observe a relatively 
smooth increase of ganyu supply (and of the probability of market entry), if we move from the 
richer to the poorer expenditure quintiles. Thus, clearly, ganyu supply is much more relevant 
for poorer households, but a strong influence of the subsistence constraint, as claimed by 
Hypothesis 2, does not find any empirical support in our data. 
Household shocks significantly increase the supply of ganyu days. This provides some 
support to Hypothesis 3 of ganyu as an ex-post coping mechanism. Interestingly, the effect is 
strongest if the shock is related to death or illness of household members even though this 
implies a simultaneous loss in family labour. Moreover, in line with Hypothesis 5 on social 
insurance, neither of the household shocks has a significant effect on the probability to enter 
the ganyu market on the supply side. Village level shocks are insignificant in all of the overall 
regressions.  
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here>> 
 
Moving to the regressions by expenditure quintile, we will be able to see whether the 
overall effects presented in Table 2 mask differences between income groups. The complete 
sets of results for both the tobit and the probit are displayed in the Annex, Table A2 and 
Table A3 respectively. The effects of the control variables generally correspond to those in 
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the overall model and will not be discussed in detail here. Instead, we will present a detailed 
comparison of coefficients by expenditure group for our most relevant explanatory variables, 
i.e. the shock variables and the wages.  
Table 3 presents the effects of the two household level shocks and the village level 
shock on ganyu supply and the probability to supply labour in the ganyu market. The tobit 
models show that for all but the 5th expenditure quintile, at least some of the shocks show a 
significant effect on ganyu supply. As the wealthiest income group seems to be generally less 
involved in ganyu supply, the lack of any impact of a shock is not really surprising in this 
context. The coping strategy suggested by Hypothesis 3 does not appear to be relevant to 
these households. The coefficients of household shocks are generally positive, ranging from 
an increase in ganyu supply of over 5 days for the poorest quintile to below 2 days for the 
wealthier quintiles. As opposed to the overall regression, we now also find some significant 
coefficients for the village level shocks. While it is significantly positive in the 4th quintile, it 
is significantly negative in the 1st quintile. This explains why the effect cancels out in the 
overall equation.  
How can we explain the negative coefficient of the village shock variable for the 
lowest expenditure quintile? As a village level shock implies that many families are affected 
simultaneously, they might all want to supply more ganyu while ganyu opportunities remain 
limited or even shrink. In this event, it seems that the extremely poor have considerably less 
chances to be hired than prospective ganyu workers from higher income groups. Thus in fact, 
these poor families may want to use ganyu as a coping strategy, but effectively can do so only 
in case of individual household shocks that do not affect a whole village population. 
Hypothesis 4 of ganyu being an ex-post coping strategy especially for the poor can thus not be 
accepted without qualification. Clear evidence for this hypothesis exists only for household 
level shocks. 
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Let us now examine which quintiles may use ganyu as an ex-ante networking or social 
insurance strategy. Looking at the results of our probit estimations we see that shocks have 
hardly any influence on the probability of households to enter the ganyu market. Only in two 
cases, one of the household shocks turns out to be marginally significant. One of these is in 
the 5th quintile which may have better market access options anyway and may not need 
networking through ganyu. For instance, other households may benefit from a relationship 
with these wealthier families, and therefore be happy to help out when such a family is struck 
by a crisis, which is anyway expected to be rapidly overcome.  
In so far as the insurance effect is concerned, the most interesting case appears to be 
that of quintile 4. In this quintile, as mentioned above, the village shock effect is positive and 
significant in the tobit regression, i.e. despite restricted demand these households manage to 
effectively supply more ganyu in the aftermath of village level shocks. However, this does not 
seem to hold in the case of entry into the ganyu market. Thus, households benefit from 
increased ganyu supply possibilities only conditional to already being in the market. This 
provides some evidence for Hypothesis 6 which suggests a social insurance effect mostly for 
intermediate income groups.  
For the poorest quintiles, shocks do not significantly change the probability to enter 
the market, either. However, as stated before, even if these households are already in the 
market, they can increase their ganyu supply in case of special need only when the shock is 
restricted to the level of the individual household. Thus for the very poor, the social insurance 
strategy does not seem to work in the case of wide-spread, village level shocks. This is, of 
course, a very serious limitation to the benefits of ganyu as a social networking strategy. 
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here>> 
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Let us now examine the wage effect by expenditure quintile which is presented in 
Table 4. Following Hypothesis 1 and the Dessing (2002) argument on the bends of the off-
farm labour supply curve, we expect households around the subsistence level, i.e. in the 
second expenditure quintile, to respond to falling wages by increasing their ganyu supply. For 
our hypothesis, only the tobit results are directly relevant.  
We find that all coefficients are positive, highly significant, and very similar in size, in 
contrast to what Hypothesis 1 suggests. In all expenditure quintiles, an increase of the daily 
wage rate by 1 MK leads to between 0.19 and 0.25 more days of ganyu supplied. There is no 
evidence at all for a negatively sloped ganyu supply curve in any of the income quintiles.  
While this does not necessarily contradict the general argument that closeness to the 
subsistence constraint leads to a dominance of the income effect over the substitution effect in 
general, there is no evidence that this is the case in the ganyu market. The need for the very 
poor to compensate for falling wages through more work does not lead to more ganyu supply, 
but possibly to more labour on one’s own farm. As Hypothesis 2 has already been rejected on 
the basis of the overall regressions, the whole argument of ganyu as a last resort strategy to 
ensure food security and to comply with a given subsistence constraint does not seem 
appropriate. The evidence against both Hypothesis 1 and 2 also contradicts the belief, 
articulated in some of the literature on Malawi, that ganyu typically pushes households into a 
poverty trap. This is consistent with the recent results by Orr et al. (2009). 
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here>> 
 
One additional outcome from our empirical analysis, highlighted in Table 4 is, 
however, that the poor may find it more difficult to benefit from rising wages, if they are not 
in the ganyu market in the first place. This is what we find when looking at the results of the 
probit estimation. Only for households in the highest two expenditure quintiles, a rise in the 
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ganyu wage leads to a significantly increased probability to enter the ganyu market. By 
analogy with the insurance argument, this implies that there may be a good reason – 
especially for the poor – to always participate in the ganyu market to some extent. In that 
case, they are in the market, and the corresponding link to the employer seems to help them in 
situations in which they might want to increase their supply, either in case of household 
shocks or in case of ganyu being more attractive due to higher wage rates. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Ganyu labour – often described in the literature as a paradoxical risk management 
mechanism which eventually pushes households into a spiral of ever greater destitution – is an 
important feature of rural Malawi. Using data from the Second Integrated Household Survey 
for 2004 (Malawi Government, 2004) we do find evidence for ganyu as a risk management 
strategy in two ways: it is used as an ex-post strategy to cope with shocks, but also as an ex-
ante strategy to make sure that extra supply in periods of need will actually be possible. This 
second strategy resembles some kind of an implicit social insurance mechanism. However, 
this insurance does not work for the very poor when village level shocks strike. In these 
situations, extremely poor households often have to reduce their off-farm labour even if they 
have been in the market before the shock. For them, the insurance strategy appears to work 
only in the event of individual household shocks.  
Generally, ganyu supply is clearly more frequent among the poor. However, we do not 
find any specific link between ganyu supply and households living at or under the subsistence 
level. Rather, there seems to be a relatively smooth common relationship between income and 
ganyu supply across all expenditure levels. In addition, there is no evidence for a negative 
effect of wages on supply. Throughout all expenditure quintiles, households significantly 
increase ganyu supply in response to a rise in wages. However, for the poor, an actual 
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increase in the probability to enter the ganyu market in order to benefit from higher wages 
appears to be difficult. 
Overall, in our analysis, ganyu does not appear as a mechanism which would drive 
households into destitution. While poverty traps certainly exist in Malawi, they do not appear 
to be induced by ganyu labour. To the contrary, ganyu may help families to effectively cope 
with shocks. Indeed, a severe problem for the poorest households seems to be the fact that 
they are often not able to supply additional ganyu in the event of village level shocks affecting 
a large part of the population. When many people want to supply ganyu and ganyu 
opportunities are restrained, the very poor seem to face the greatest difficulty in finding 
employment in the ganyu market. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of agricultural households in Malawi (population estimates) 
 
 Ganyu supplying 
households  
(no demand) 
Ganyu demanding 
households 
(no supply) 
Households with 
both supply and 
demand of ganyu 
Households with 
neither supply nor 
demand of ganyu 
Share of households 43.69% 
[42.06% - 45.34%] 
16.10% 
[14.97% - 17.29%]
8.57% 
[7.89% - 9.29%] 
31.64% 
[30.09% - 33.24%]
Share of households below 
the poverty line 
25.68% 
[23.61% - 27.74] 
3.78% 
[2.88% - 4.68%] 
9.94% 
[7.69% - 12.19%] 
16.63% 
[14.74% - 18.52%]
Share of severely 
underweight children under 5 
years (weight for age, -3 sd) 
8.67% 
[7.39% - 9.99%] 
4.87% 
[3.49% - 6.24%] 
6.06% 
[4.15% - 7.97%] 
7.59% 
[6.02% – 9.16%] 
Share of households with iron 
roof  
8.10% 
[7.12% - 9.08%] 
51.03% 
[47.36% - 54.69%]
28.64% 
[24.64% - 32.63%] 
17.66% 
[15.75% - 19.58%]
Average number of 
household members 
4.65 
[4.57 – 4.73] 
4.87 
[4.73 – 5.01] 
5.22 
[5.06 – 5.38] 
4.26 
[4.16 – 4.36] 
Share of female headed 
households 
26.82% 
[25.43% – 28.21%]
15.37% 
[13.53% – 17.21%]
17.83% 
[15.00% - 20.65%] 
25.58% 
[23.89% - 27.26%]
Average education of 
household head (years of 
schooling; range 0-19) 
3.37 
[3.24 – 3.49] 
6.90 
[6.59 – 7.21] 
5.08 
[4.79 – 5.37] 
4.10 
[3.93 – 4.27] 
Share of households growing 
maize 
96.17% 
[95.26% - 97.07%] 
98.39% 
[97.68% - 99.10%]
98.71% 
[97.99% - 99.44%] 
93.78% 
[92.57% - 94.99%]
Share of households growing 
cash crops (tobacco, cotton 
or hybrid maize) 
60.75% 
[58.31% - 63.19%] 
74.72% 
[72.15% - 77.28%]
70.37% 
[66.75% - 74.00%] 
59.38% 
[56.96% - 61.79%]
Average number of different 
crops (rainy season) 
3.22 
[3.13 – 3.32] 
3.50 
[3.35 – 3.66] 
3.58 
[3.41 – 3.76] 
3.04 
[2.94 – 3.14] 
Share of land uncultivated 26.19% 
[24.05% - 28.34%] 
19.45% 
[17.11% - 21.80%]
25.99% 
[22.81% - 29.17%] 
24.27% 
[21.78% - 26.75%]
Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. All population estimates take into account the stratified sample 
structure as well as household weights (using STATA survey data commands).  
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Table 2: Determinants of ganyu supply and the probability to enter the ganyu market 
 Regression 1 
 
Tobit 
 
E(ganyu days |  
    ganyu days>0) 
Regression 2  
 
Probit 
 
Pr(ganyu days>0) 
Regression 3  
 
Tobit  
 
E(ganyu days| 
    ganyu days>0) 
Regression 4  
 
Probit 
 
Pr(ganyu days>0) 
Wage      
Ganyu wage 0.19*** 
(0.00) 
0.0009** 
(0.02) 
0.21*** 
(0.00) 
0.001*** 
(0.00) 
Shocks     
Household personal 
shock 
2.62** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
2.83** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
Household property 
shock 
1.77* 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
2.06* 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
Village shock -0.02 
(0.97) 
0.007 
(0.64) 
-0.02 
(0.97) 
0.007 
(0.64) 
Productivity     
Small plot 2.65*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
2.02** 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Dry season cultivation -1.09 
(0.19) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.64 
(0.44) 
0.05*** 
(0.00) 
Education -1-60*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-1.38*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Age household head -0.26*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.24*** 
(0.00) 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
Wealth     
Iron roof -17.44*** 
(0.00) 
-0.23*** 
(0.00) 
-15.34*** 
(0.00) 
-0.21*** 
(0.00) 
Ultra poor 10.66*** 
(0.00) 
0.1*** 
(0.00) 
  
Expenditure quintile 1   22.93*** 
(0.00) 
0.24*** 
(0.00) 
Expenditure quintile 2   16.76*** 
(0.00) 
0.17*** 
(0.00) 
Expenditure quintile 3   11.65*** 
(0.00) 
0.13*** 
(0.00) 
Expenditure quintile 4   4.40*** 
(0.00) 
0.06*** 
(0.00) 
Household 
characteristics 
    
Adults 5.87*** 
(0.00) 
0.05*** 
(0.00) 
4.66*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
Female household 
head 
1.46 
(0.16) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
1.45 
(0.16) 
0.05*** 
(0.00) 
Dependents -1.02 
(0.57) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
-9.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
North -10.87*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
-10.94*** 
(0.00) 
-0.12*** 
(0.00) 
Wald (F-Test for 
probit) 
Chi2(14)=692.26  
(0.00) 
F(14, 411)=49.62  
(0.00) 
Chi2(17)=714.05  
(0.00) 
F(17, 408)=43.62  
(0.00) 
N 9994 9994 9994 9994 
Notes:  Marginal effects or discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. 
P values in parentheses;* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The stratified sample structure is taken into account in the estimation of standard errors [using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator for probit, and bootstrapping (500 replications) for tobit]. 
Constant term not presented here.  
Quintile 5 (the richest quintile) is used as the comparison group. 
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Table 3: Shock effect on ganyu supply and the probability to enter the ganyu market for 
different expenditure quintiles 
 
Dependent variable: 
ganyu days 
 Tobit: E(ganyu days | 
ganyu days>0) 
Probit:  
Pr(ganyu days>0) 
Expenditure quintile 1 Household personal shock 5.02 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
Household property shock 5.90** 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.54) 
Village shock -6.64*** 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.32) 
Expenditure quintile 2 Household personal shock 5.37* 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
Household property shock 2.52 
(0.43) 
-0.009 
(0.78) 
Village shock 0.21 
(0.92) 
-0.01 
(0.63) 
Expenditure quintile 3 Household personal shock 0.36 
(0.88) 
-0.04 
(0.16) 
Household property shock 4.48* 
(0.05) 
0.06* 
(0.07) 
Village shock -0.50 
(0.78) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
Expenditure quintile 4 Household personal shock 1.79 
(0.36) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
Household property shock 1.80 
(0.33) 
0.025 
(0.41) 
Village shock 2.38* 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.24) 
Expenditure quintile 5 Household personal shock 2.79 
(0.13) 
0.06* 
(0.07) 
Household property shock -0.88 
(0.57) 
0.003 
(0.90) 
Village shock 1.70 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
Source: Annex Tables A2 and A3. 
Notes:  Effect of a change of the shock variables from 0 to 1 (at the mean of all other variables). 
P values in parentheses;* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The stratified sample structure is taken into account in the estimation of standard errors [using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator for probit, and bootstrapping (500 replications) for tobit]. 
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Table 4: Wage effect on ganyu supply and the probability to enter the ganyu market for 
different expenditure quintiles 
 
Effect of ganyu wage on days ganyu Tobit: E(ganyu days | 
ganyu days>0) 
Probit:  
Pr(ganyu days>0)  
Expenditure quintile 1 0.19*** 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.45) 
Expenditure quintile 2 0.21*** 
(0.00) 
-0.0005 
(0.42) 
Expenditure quintile 3 0.21*** 
(0.00) 
0.0009 
(0.13) 
Expenditure quintile 4 0.25*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
Expenditure quintile 5 0.19*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
Source: Annex Tables A2 and A3. 
Notes:  Marginal effects; p values in parentheses;* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The stratified sample structure is taken into account in the estimation of standard errors [using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator for probit, and bootstrapping (500 replications) for tobit]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of households supplying or hiring ganyu for different expenditure decile 
Shares of households supplying or hiring ganyu
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
expenditure decile
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 g
an
yu ganyu
supply
ganyu
demand
(rainy)
ganyu
demand
(dry)
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
%
ga y
su
ganyu
demand 
(rainy 
season)
ganyu
demand 
(dry 
season)
 
Note: A distinction between the rainy and the dry season is not available for ganyu supply. 
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Figure 2: Share of households involved in ganyu by season and district 
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Figure 3: Labour supply and the subsistence constraint  
 
Source: Dessing (2002: 440). 
Note: The subsistence constraint includes all wage-labour combinations that just ensure a (fixed) minimum 
subsistence income. Any points in the segment BB of the labour supply curve just ensure subsistence. 
Below the subsistence constraint, T depends on the wage rate and labour supply adjusts to this 
constraint (segment AA). 
      Wage 
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Annex  
 
Table A1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std Min Max 
Ganyu days  No. of days a household supplies ganyu 
labour (per year) (>0 for 52% of all 
households) 
36.25 71.77 0 1249 
Ganyu wage Regional wage paid for a day of ganyu in 
Malawi Kwacha 
70.01 21.10 34.62 119.19 
Household personal shock  = 1 if household head died or a working 
member turned ill/had an accident in this 
year, 0 otherwise  
0.16 0.37 0 1 
Household property shock  = 1 if household experienced a shock for 
livestock died or stolen, other theft in 
this year, dwelling damaged 
0.16 0.38 0 1 
Village shock  = 1 if village experienced droughts, 
floods, crop disease, crop pest, or a rise 
in food price in the past year, 0 otherwise 
0.41 0.49 0 1 
Small plot = 1 if household’s farm land is smaller 
than 0.5 hectares, 0 otherwise 
0.31 0.46 0 1 
Dry season cultivation = 1 if households cultivate any type of 
subsistence crop in the dry season, 0 
otherwise 
0.36 0.48 0 1 
education Years of schooling of household head 4.31 3.97 0 19 
Age household head Age of household head 43.29 16.52 14 103 
Iron roof = 1 if household’s roof is made of iron 
sheets, clay tiles or concrete, 0 otherwise 
0.19 0.39 0 1 
Expenditure quintile 1 - 5 Expenditure quintiles with 1 lowest and 
5 highest  
  0 1 
Ultra poor = 1 if household is unable to purchase 
enough food to meet caloric 
requirements for subsistence,  
0 otherwise 
0.17 0.38 0 1 
Adults No. of individuals 15-64 years of age per 
household 
2.27 1.22 0 11 
Female household head = 1 if household head is female, 0 
otherwise  
0.23 0.42 0 1 
Dependents no. of children (0-14 years) and elderly 
(over 64 years) divided by no. of total 
household members 
0.46 0.24 0 1 
North = 1 if household lives in the Region 
North, 0 otherwise 
0.10 0.30 0 1 
Notes:  The stratified sample structure and weights are taken into account in the descriptive statistics. 
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Table A2: Determinants of ganyu supply for different expenditure quintiles 
 
Tobit  
Estimated effects on 
E(ganyu days ¦  
    ganyu days>0) 
Expenditure 
quintile 1 
 
Expenditure 
quintile 2 
Expenditure 
quintile 3 
Expenditure 
quintile 4 
Expenditure 
quintile 5 
Wage       
Ganyu wage 0.19*** 
(0.00) 
0.21*** 
(0.00) 
0.21*** 
(0.00) 
0.25*** 
(0.00) 
0.19*** 
(0.00) 
Shocks      
Household personal shock 5.02 
(0.10) 
5.37* 
(0.09) 
0.36 
(0.88) 
1.79 
(0.36) 
2.79 
(0.13) 
Household property shock 5.90** 
(0.04) 
2.52 
(0.43) 
4.48* 
(0.05) 
1.80 
(0.33) 
-0.88 
(0.57) 
Village shock -6.64*** 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.92) 
-0.50 
(0.78) 
2.38* 
(0.09) 
1.70 
(0.23) 
Productivity      
Small plot 4.22* 
(0.09) 
3.32 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.96) 
2.57* 
(0.07) 
0.836 
(0.56) 
Dry season cultivation -5.63** 
(0.01) 
1.17 
(0.60) 
2.48 
(0.18) 
0.77 
(0.58) 
-3.06** 
(0.03) 
Education -1.00*** 
(0.00) 
-1.09*** 
(0.00) 
-1.07*** 
(0.00) 
-1.35*** 
(0.00) 
-1.50*** 
(0.00) 
Age household head -0.009 
(0.90) 
-0.25*** 
(0.00) 
-0.31*** 
(0.00) 
-0.23*** 
(0.00) 
-0.29*** 
(0.00) 
Wealth      
Iron roof -20.24*** 
(0.00) 
-9.46** 
(0.01) 
-12.97*** 
(0.00) 
-12.77*** 
(0.00) 
-16.08*** 
(0.00) 
Household 
characteristics 
     
Adults 6.79*** 
(0.00) 
5.73*** 
(0.00) 
4.59*** 
(0.00) 
2.70*** 
(0.00) 
4.58*** 
(0.00) 
Female household head 1.94 
(0.51) 
3.75 
(0.15) 
6.07** 
(0.01) 
-0.47 
(0.78) 
0.02 
(0.99) 
Dependents -5.30 
(0.56) 
-4.86 
(0.40) 
-7.36 
(0.14) 
-9.15*** 
(0.00) 
-7.32*** 
(0.00) 
North -20.12*** 
(0.00) 
-16.51*** 
(0.00) 
-15.23*** 
(0.00) 
-5.52*** 
(0.00) 
-3.17* 
(0.08) 
Wald  Chi2(13)=142.6
(0.00) 
Chi2(13)=98.7 
(0.00) 
Chi2(13)=148.6
(0.00) 
Chi2(13)=188.0
(0.00) 
Chi2(13)=182.7
(0.00) 
N 1588 1872 2010 2207 2317 
Notes:  Marginal effects or discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. 
P values in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The stratified sample structure is taken into account in the estimation of standard errors [using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator for probit, and bootstrapping (500 replications) for tobit]. 
Constant term not presented here.  
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Table A3: Determinants of ganyu market entry for different expenditure quintiles 
 
Probit  
Estimated effects 
on Pr(ganyu 
days>0) 
Expenditure 
quintile 1 
 
Expenditure 
quintile 2 
Expenditure 
quintile 3 
Expenditure 
quintile 4 
Expenditure 
quintile 5 
Wage       
Ganyu wage -0.006 
(0.45) 
-0.0005 
(0.42) 
0.0009 
(0.13) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
Shocks      
Household 
personal shock 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
0.06* 
(0.07) 
Household 
property shock 
0.02 
(0.54) 
-0.009 
(0.78) 
0.06* 
(0.07) 
0.025 
(0.41) 
0.003 
(0.90) 
Village shock -0.03 
(0.32) 
-0.01 
(0.63) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
Productivity      
Small plot 0.05 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
0.04* 
(0.05) 
0.04* 
(0.07) 
Dry season 
cultivation 
-0.003 
(0.91) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.00) 
0.08*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.64) 
Education -0.01** 
(0.01) 
-0.009 
(0.02) 
-0.009** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Age household 
head 
-0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004***  
(0.00) 
-0.005*** 
(0.00) 
Wealth      
Iron roof -0.23*** 
(0.00) 
-0.17*** 
(0.00) 
-0.18*** 
(0.00) 
-0.18*** 
(0.00) 
-0.24*** 
(0.00) 
Household 
characteristics 
     
Adults 0.03** 
(0.03) 
0.02* 
(0.05) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.02** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.00) 
Female household 
head 
0.04 
(0.11) 
0.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.13*** 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.47) 
-0.01 
(0.74) 
Dependents -0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
-0.13** 
(0.01) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
North -0.18*** 
(0.00) 
-0.19*** 
(0.00) 
-0.18*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.25) 
-0.05 
(0.18) 
F-Test  F(13, 412)=6.08 
(0.00) 
F(13, 412)=7.36 
(0.00) 
F(13, 412)=11.3 
(0.00) 
F(13, 412)=10.2 
(0.00) 
F(13, 412)= 21.8 
(0.00) 
N 1588 1872 2010 2207 2317 
Notes:  Marginal effects or discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. 
P values in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The stratified sample structure is taken into account in the estimation of standard errors [using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator for probit, and bootstrapping (500 replications) for tobit]. 
Constant term not presented here.  
 
 
